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Introduction
In Living by Zen, Suzuki Daisetz writes:
When we hear a bell or see a bird flying, we must do so by 
means of a mind perfected by satori [AznjAd]; that is to say, we 
hear the bell even prior to its ringing, and see the bird even prior 
to its flight. Once the bell rings or the bird flies, they are already 
in the world of the senses, which means that they are dif­
ferentiated, subject to intellectual analysis and synthesis... .*
‘ Daisetz T. Suzuki, Living to Zen (New York: Samuel Weiser, 1972), p. 74. See 
also op. tit., p. 63 for a brief discussion of the “neurotic” temporal patterning of our lives. 
On the relationship between Zen and therapy, see Thomas P. Kasulis, “Zen Buddhism, 
Freud, and Jung,” 7TU Eastern Buddhist, vol. 10, no. 1 (May, 1977), pp. 68-91. Also 
consider David Michael Levin, “Self-Knowledge and the Talking Cure,” Review of 
Existential Psychology and Psychiatry, vol. XV, nos. 2-3 (1977), pp. 95-111.
2 Tarthang Tulku, Time, Space, and Knowledge (Emeryville, California: Dharma 
Press, 1977). See also his earlier book, Gesture of Balance (Emeryville: Dharma Press, 
197^)-
What does he mean? What is he saying? Speaking personally, I must 
confess that I struggled for a long time with this passage in an effort to 
understand it. What I would like to share with you now is the clarifica­
tion I have begun to enjoy. For this experiential “breakthrough,**  I 
am especially grateful to Tarthang Tulku, a Tibetan teacher (lama) in 
the ancient rNyingma-pa tradition of Buddhism, whose new book, Time, 
Space, and Knowledge: A New Vision of Reality, provides us with some 
extremely effective meditation practices and very helpful commentaries.* 2
Basically, Suzuki is attempting to characterize the Zen experience 
of time. What he offers us in language which is not just picturesque, but 
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indeed very accurate, is a phenomenological description of how, through medi­
tative practice, we may learn to experience the temporal structure, or 
patterning, of our everyday life (the life which Husserl sets in 
the Lebenswelt}3 in a surprisingly new way.
3 See Edmund Husserl, The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness (Bloomington, 
Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1964). Abo consider Husserl’s Crisis of European 
Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 
rg7o). And, for an excellent introduction to the concrete practice of phenomenology, 
I recommend Donald Ihde, Experimental Phenomenology (New York: Capricorn Books, 
<977).
4 See Martin Heidegger, Bring and Time (New York: Harper and Row, 1962) and 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (New York: Humanities Press, 1962).
5 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 347. Sec also op. cii., pp. 420-423.
In what follows, then, I would like to focus, first, on our ordinary 
(so-called “normal”) experiencing of the structure of time. I would like 
to focus, that is, on how we have temporally structured our standard experience. 
Once we have achieved a very clear phenomenological sense of the 
felt meaning, or felt qualities, of our temporal experience as we naturally 
and habitually live it, perhaps we may begin to realize that there is a 
feasible alternative way of patterning our experience. Our analysis 
will close, then, with a concise and, I hope, clear diagnostic interpretation 
of the experiential characteristics of this alternative process of temporal 
structuring.
Although the phenomenological movement, fathered by Edmund 
Husserl and then cultured by the work of Martin Heidegger and Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty,4 will be extremely helpful in preparing the Western 
mind for the alternative experience of time, I wish to stress that there 
is no substitute for the focusing and visualization of meditative practice. 
And, from this standpoint, I can think of no source of instruction superior 
to Rinpoche’s book, Time, Space, and Knowledge, in which his ancient 
Tibetan tradition has been blessed with new life through a powerful and 
exemplary transmission especially well suited to the present needs and 
capacities of our Western sensibility.
Past and future: inveterate tendencies
In Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty argues that “I am borne 
into personal existence by a time which I do not constitute.”5 Now, as 
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we know, Jean Piaget has shown that this originary time, a timing which 
is granted me at birth and which belongs to my anonymous and pre- 
egological existence, is structured very differently from the time which 
rules my life in its later stages, once the Ego is firmly ensconced on the 
throne.6 Thus, we undergo a process of temporal restructuring as we 
pass from infancy through childhood and into the adult world of temporal 
obligations. This fact is of decisive importance for the interpretation 
of Merleau-Ponty’s observation, no less true of time, than of space: “What 
protects the sane man against delirium and hallucination is not his critical 
powers, but the structure of his space.* ”
• See, the work of Jean Piaget, for example: 77k Child's Conception of the World (New 
Jersey: Littlefield, Adams, &. Co., 1969); 77k Child'3 Conception of Physical Causality 
(New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams, &. Co., 1972); and The Construction of Reality in the 
Child (New York: Ballantine, 1975)’
7 Merleau-Ponty, op. at., p. 291.
Before we hasten to concur, however, we should perhaps pause to 
consider the consequences of recognizing the fact that such appeals to 
the concept of sanity will always be relative, perforce, to a certain norm, 
a certain standard of health. Suppose we ask, then, the following ques­
tions: Granted that the structuring of time (that is to say, the temporal 
structuring of our experience) is not only a priori necessary as a condition 
of human consciousness, but is indeed necessary for the maintenance of 
some basic condition of psycho-physical satisfaction or health, could it 
be that there are alternative modalities of temporal structuring? In other 
words, we agree that some (kind of) structuring is needed; and, in any 
case, as Kant proved so well, it is a priori necessary for the unity of con­
sciousness. But we may contest the assumption that what passes for the 
normal structuring of the “sane man” could not be fundamentally 
different, fundamentally changed or modified. To be sure, we need 
protection against delirium and hallucination. But what kind of protec­
tion? And how much? Is it not entirely conceivable that adults, having 
safely passed through the infantile years of vulnerability, could allow 
themselves a greater degree of openness? To what extent do we protect 
ourselves against quite imaginary dangers of delirium and hallucination ? 
To what extent do we temporally structure our experience in a way 
that is needlessly defensive and aversive? Perhaps, when we focus more 
rigorously on the felt quality of our temporal structuration, we will begin *7
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to realize not only how frustrating, how unsatisfactory this process actually 
is, but also how profoundly (if obscurely) responsible we are for main­
taining this temporal pattern.
We will return to this theme later on, when we examine the difference 
between representation and presence as ways of responding to and 
patterning the temporality of our existential situation. Suffice it for now 
to stress a point which Merleau-Ponty makes in his discussion of the 
development (Sinnesgenesis) of human temporality:
The past, therefore, is not past, nor the future, future. They 
exist only when a subjectivity is there to disrupt the plenitude of 
being in itself, to adumbrate a perspective, and to introduce non- 
being into it.*
• Merleau-Ponty, op. at., p. 421.
What happens when a new “subjectivity” is thrown into the plenitude 
of being? What happens, in other words, when a child is borne into 
the world? Well, let us answer this question in phenomenological terms 
by entering into the child’s experience and interpreting it, as it were, 
from within. According to the phenomenologists, even the child’s earliest 
experience is inherently organized into what they call a rudimentary 
“temporal ek-stasis": a primordial centrifugal dispersal of awareness, 
essentially involving passing phases of “retentional” and “protentional” 
consciousness. Experience is, in brief, a flowing process of figure/ground 
focusings (Husserl: lebendig-strSmende Gegenwarf), such that every now­
present phase of focus is experienced as receding without interruption into 
the distance (the horizonal past) while, at the same time, phases or 
aspects of that same now-present which is now past—phases or aspects 
which were then experienced as foreshadowing, or protending, something 
horizonally future—move, or pass, into the novelty of the living, focused 
present, either confirming or surprising our orientation. This rudimentary, 
founding time-structure (Gestallung) is the primordial ecstasy of infantile 
experience, a sort of paradisiacal stage, out of which there gradually 
develops, in more or less the way that Piaget has carefully established, 
a more reflectively involuted, less tenuously differentiated structuring of 
experience: the familiar patternings, namely, of past(s), present(s), and 
future(s), constituted through various simple and nested acts of remember­
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ing, recollecting, anticipating, expecting, and so forth.’ (Philosophers 
tend, unfortunately, to consider our temporal experience as though it 
belonged to the re-presentations of a disembodied Cartesian cogito, rather 
than to an embodied, sentient being. It would be worthwhile pondering, 
perhaps, how the child’s acquisition of temporal language—the use of 
tenses, for example—is related to his developing proprioceptive awareness, 
or feeling, of bodily tensions.)
Now, I am not trying to argue that such re-presentational structuring, 
which in any case is not only our essential human destiny, but also our 
needed and privileged endowment, is inherently undesirable or painful. 
On the contrary! But I do wish to diagnose the way in which such struc­
turing tends, as we grow older, to become unnecessarily and—what is 
worse—painfully rigid and fixed and solidified. The flowing, but still 
structured, process tends to become increasingly partitioned, patterned 
into relatively isolated, partially alien (or heteronomous) units, very much 
like, in fact, the irreversible, linear series of punctiform “nows” which, 
according to David Hume, we somehow hold together.9 10 (So Hume’s 
analysis of our experience of time is, in a certain sense, quite accurate. We 
might say that he accurately portrays the psychopathology of temporal 
experience, For the “punctual” person characteristically embodies, 
9 Sec Edmund Husserl, Ideas: A General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. Translated 
by W. R. Boyce-Gibson. (New York: Collier Books, 1962), esp. sections 81-84 (PP- 
215-224) and section 100 (pp. 269-270).
10 See David Michael Levin, “Freud’s Divided Heart and Saraha's Cure,” Inquiry, 
vol. 20, nos. 2-3 (Summer, 1977), pp. J65-188. (I would like to point out, however, 
that there are some errors in this paper. First, my interpretation of “NirminakSya,” 
p. 188, n. 53, should read: “the painful but self-transforming ego-body.” Second, the in­
terpretation of "Sambhogakiya” should read: “the blissful body which, through myth- 
opoeic imagination, creatively perfects the discipline of the super-ego.”) Also consider 
the pathbreaking work of Eugene Gendlin: “A Theory of Personality Change,” in P. 
Worchel and D. Byrne (eds.), Personality Change (New York: John Wiley, 1964); “Focus­
ing Ability in Psychotherapy, Personality, and Creativity,” in J. M. Shlien, ed.), 
Research in Psychotherapy, vol. Ill (Washington: American Psychological Association,
1968) ; “Focusing,” in Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice, vol. 6, no. 1 (Winter,
1969) ; and “Experiential Phenomenology,” in Maurice Natanson (ed.), Phenomenology 
and the Social Sciences (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973). I don’t know of 
any better technique, outside the Buddhist traditions of meditation practice, for helping 
us to focus on our present experiential processes in a fully open and accepting way, so 
that the various painful and frustrating pattemings of temporality can be seen through, 
penetrated, and abandoned (abolished).
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and exemplifies, this neurotic, i.e., painful and frustrating, tendency to 
pattern time into an irreversible series of now-points: his need for punc­
tuality requires, is expressed in, and is reflected by, a punctuated time­
line. Such punctuality is a source of distress, not just for ourselves, but 
also for the others whom we press into the narrow tube of time. The 
problem, of course, is that the portrait Hume offers is not at all intended 
to reflect any real pathology.)
Let me spell out this argument as concretely as I can. First, we will 
consider the nature of this tendency in our so-called “normal” experience 
of, or relationship with, the past. Then we will turn to the working of this 
same tendency in our experiencing of the future. You will undoubtedly 
recognize at once the sort of experience in question: experiential pattem- 
ings we are all too familiar with. Bearing in mind the root meaning of 
the word “ek-stasis” (“standing out”), we will see that these common 
pattemings are symptomatic of a process of “maturing” in which the 
original ecstasy of the child’s temporal openness has gradually come down 
to a form of ek-static distraction. Pascal, it seems, understood this very 
clearly, when he warns us, in his Penstes: “But diversion amuses us, and 
leads us unconsciously to death.”11
11 Blaise Pascal, Peiuies (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1958), section 171, p. 49.
Basically, there are two kinds of re-presentational experience which 
are related to the past and are, as forms of attachment (desire or aversion), 
equally painful, frustrating, and unfulfilling. In the one, we turn away 
from the present (the gift or present, of the present) in order to return 
to a past which we imagine to have been more pleasing, more joyful, and 
more fulfilling. (It is crucial to realize that the past we are returning to 
is an imaginary past, and not a past we simply recall. I can indeed recall 
a wonderful and joyful past; but I certainly cannot recall that past as mon 
joyful, or more wonderful than my present. The diagnostic implications 
of this fact are, I am sure, quite obvious.) We have an “inveterate tend­
ency,” as Professor Herbert Guenther puts it, to make excessive and 
uncompromising demands, in our infantile desire for “perfect satisfaction” 
from the present. We approach the present situation with a jaundiced 
eye, setting it up, in effect, such that we are bound to be frustrated, bound 
to experience it as unsatisfactory. The present can’t possibly match up to 
our cleverly idealized reconstruction of the past (a past which, un­
doubtedly, never was). The present is paradise lost. So we cling with 
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desire to our re-presentation of the past and foolishly reject the present. 
But, since we do this repeatedly, with one present after another, is it not 
true that we are merely passing from one frustration to another, and 
repeating the same fundamental error over and over again ?
We might call this the pattern of nostalgia. It is often charged with 
an intensely melancholy, perhaps depressive, tone. And it frequently 
carries not only a feeling of dullness or ennui, but also even a feeling of 
compulsion, a sense of overwhelming flight and distraction. (Buddhist 
texts will speak of the realm of “hungry ghosts.”) This re-presentational 
patterning is doubly self-destructive and self-punishing, since, on the 
one hand, we cannot wilfully retrieve the satisfactions of the past (if such 
they were) as still present. We must learn the truth of impermanence and 
the practice of “releasement” (Heidegger; “Gelassenheit”')'1 Nor, on 
the other hand, can we begin to find any satisfaction in the present so 
long as we rage against it and persist in refusing what the present has to 
offer.
13 See Martin Heidegger’* critique of Nietzjche’s account of “the will’s revulsion 
against time,” in What Is Calltd Thinking? (New York: Harper and Row, 1968).
a* Michel de Montaigne, The Comple It Essays. Translated by Donald M. Frame 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), Book I: 39: 176.
14 Op. til., Book III: 4: 637.
19 Merlcau-Ponty, op. cit., p. 85.
Now, the second distressing relationship with the past involves a con­
stant return to, and a constant repetition of, its most painful and frustrat­
ing aspects. Montaigne observes: “We take our chains along with us; 
our freedom is not complete; we still turn our eyes to what we have left 
behind, our fancy is full of it.”1’ And he adds: “How many times we 
trouble our mind with anger or sadness by such shadows, and involve 
ourselves in fanciful passions which transform both our soul and our 
body.”13 4 Freud’s studies of the “repetition compulsion” diagnose with 
very penetrating insight this tendency we have to punish ourselves again 
and again by clinging to a past which, in Merleau-Ponty’s words, “remains 
like a wound through which our strength ebbs away.”1’ Thus do we 
poison the gift of memory, turning it into the crudest of judges. But, what 
is much worse than the repeated experience of pain as such is the fact 
that this recalling of pain will not at all help us to master that past which 
still, which now haunts us. We cannot undo what is gone except by letting 
it go, letting it be past, so that we may concentrate wholeheartedly on 
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the auspicious opportunities which right now present themselves. If 
we want to enjoy our past, then we must learn how to forget it! To get 
the past as a wonderful gift, we must first be fnt to for-get it!
The compulsive need to repeat past pain and frustration begins to take 
hold of us as soon as we do not directly face, and fully deal with, the situa­
tion that confronts us in the present. When what the present presents does 
not immediate immediately please us, we tend, rather, to avoid it; we 
defer an appropriate response. We do not seem to understand that this 
re-presentationally postponed response to the present, this distant future, 
will return to haunt us, sooner or later, as the present of our earlier 
irresponsibility. In the present we harvest the seeds of the past—what 
kind of seeds are we now sowing for our future?
Corresponding to these two constitutive patterns of re-presentationally 
experiencing our past, there are two patterns of experiencing our future: 
re-presentational patterns of attachment (desire or aversion) no less 
painful and unfulfilling. Together, the four patterns of emotional attach­
ment, intimately interwoven, make up the warp and woof of time as we 
normally experience it. Now, it is not because of any inexorable ek- 
stasis as such (the dispersal of time, namely, as past, present, and future) 
that time is so painful and frustrating. Rather, time’s structure manifests 
with this “wrathful” aspect only because, at the meeting point of warp 
and woof, we discover the knot of the present, into which, through count­
less unwholesome attitudes, we have tightly bound ourselves. As such, 
the threefold nature of time is neither pleasure nor pain. So, for the 
temporal qualities we will experience, we have only our own attitudes to 
blame.
The first of the distressing/uftzraZ patterns which we will consider begins 
to take shape, and thus to shape and twist the skein of time, in our pat­
terning attitude towards the present. We arc restless, not easily satisfied. 
The present presents problems; it’s not exactly the gift we wanted, or 
hoped for. But, instead of accepting this present, we reject it and turn 
away. We despair, it seems, of working with, and working our way 
through, the given problem. Soon, we are dreaming, lost in our own 
sweet fantasies. The present is denied in favor of an imaginary 
(re-presented) future. The future, we think, is our only hope: and we 
convince ourselves that it will bring the desired gift of bliss. We are so 
sure! In fact, this attitude becomes so deeply insinuated into the very 
texture of our temporal experience that, finally, we do not even give the 
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present a second’s chance. We meet each and every present with a 
catalogue (re-presentation) of unconditional demands and expectations. 
No matter what we receive, we hoped for something better. With this 
(representational) approach, is it any wonder that the present always 
fails to provide satisfaction and a sense of fulfillment or accomplishment?
Moreover, we are substituting an unknowable, uncertain and indeed 
essentially illusory future for the opportunity to learn, through what 
Buddhists call “skillful means,” an appropriate way of experiencing the 
present, however disappointing it may at first appear, so that, in the end, 
we can discover, hidden within it, its dynamic potentialities for real 
satisfaction. When we representationally defer the present, when we 
postpone receiving its treasures (often hidden), how do we know— 
and why do we suppose—that the future will present us with a more 
easily opened treasure? We may not even have a future. So we should 
remember, as Kant once said, that one hundred merely possible thalers 
are worth nothing when balanced against the value of one real one!
The other attachment is a patterning which consists, so to speak, in 
turning over and over the old wheel of anxiety. Instead of staying with 
the present, even when what it presents us with is something in which we 
could find a measure of fulfillment, we turn away from it, preferring to 
lose ourselves in the representation of an imaginary future, into which 
we have projected all our fears, doubts, anxieties, and confusions. Thus, 
for example, a friend may very kindly give us, as a present, something he 
knows we have long desired. It is such a wonderful present! But we are 
so attached to it, so much in the grip of desire and the hunger of pos­
sessiveness, that we cannot let ourselves relax to enjoy it. I rather like 
the way Montaigne portrays this pattern: “As if he were not in time to 
suffer the pain when he is in it, he anticipates it in the imagination and 
runs to meet it.”16 Our enjoyment immediately clouds over, darkens, 
as we settle into the familiar vice of anxiety, and sinking deeper and deeper 
into inveterate tendencies, we persist in imagining the future loss or 
destruction of the present. Of course, it is well that we know all tilings to 
be impermanent. But why suffer? And, above all, why suffer in advance? 
As Montaigne writes so sagely, “He who fears he will suffer, already 
suffers from his fear.”17 And he earnestly asks us: “What good does it 
16 Montaigne, op. cit., Book II: ia: 362.
17 Montaigne, op. cit.. Book III: 13: 840.
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do you to welcome and anticipate your bad fortune, to lose the present 
through fear of the future?** 18
’• Montaigne, op. cil., Book III: 12: 804.
” Pascal, op. cil., section 172, pp. 49-50. I have slightly modified the translation.
Pascal, in fact, left us with a penetrating diagnosis of our normal 
condition. I can do no better than to let him speak:
We do not rest satisfied with the present. We anticipate the 
future as too slow in coming, as if in order to hasten its course; or 
we recall the past, to stop its too rapid flight. So imprudent are 
we that we wander in the times which arc not ours, and do 
not think of the only one which belongs to us; and so idle are we 
we that we dream of those times which are no more, and thought­
lessly overlook that which alone exists. For the present is often 
too painful for us. We conceal it from our attention when it 
troubles us; and if it be delightful to us, wc regret to see it pass 
away. Wc try to sustain it by the future, and seek to arrange 
matters which are not in our power, for a time which we have 
no certainty of reaching.
Let each one examine his thoughts, and he will find them all 
occupied with the past and the future. We scarcely ever think 
of the present; and if we think of it, it is only to take light from 
it to arrange the future. The present is never our end [or 
focus]. The past and the present are always only our means; the 
future alone is our end. So wc never live, but we hope to live; 
and, as we are always preparing to be happy, it is inevitable we 
should never be so.19
It is time to focus, I think, on how wc experience the present.
The present
Let us recall Merleau-Ponty’s words, cited earlier, but in a context which 
brought out a different configuration of meaning: “I am borne into 
personal existence by a time which I do not constitute.* ’ This time, 
then, is a gift, something I do not produce, but am granted. Do I know 
how to accept and receive it? When wc focus on how we experience the 
present of time, perhaps in the course of our meditation, or sitting practice, 
we may begin to understand the true nature and unfolding of that elusive 
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process wherein the ek-static, threefold structure of time, originally 
experienced as, or anyway with, a sort of unknowing infantile ecstasy, 
progressively loses its blissful and radiant qualities, its flow and openness, 
and becomes ever more objectified, partitioned, and closed off within the 
narrowest possible confines of a punctate now-present, strung along in 
a lusterless scries of such “nows.” The problem with this now-point, 
then, is not so much the logician’s “specious present,” which Nigiijuna 
so brilliantly destroys in his MUlamadhyamakakdrika (c. 200 a.d.), as rather 
the fact that it presents us with an emotional delusion: imperceptibly, 
we have been reduced, cheated, confined by our own inveterate tendencies 
and errant habits, within the partitions of a dull, counterfeit, death-like 
present. (With an implacable logic, Nigiijuna’s relentless dialectic 
“deconstructs” with but one stroke every position and its opposite, 
doing so even “in advance” and, thus, in a sense, timelessly—until there 
is nothing to rely on, not even the being of nothingness. Every reification 
of the concrete experiential process, whether it be only in our conceptualiz­
ing or also in our practical existence, is dialectically penetrated, seen 
through, and “deconstructed.” NSgiijuna has much to say about the 
unwholesome temporal partitions—representations—we tend to erect.)
Of course, it cannot be a question of returning to the inarticulate 
bliss of childhood. What we need to ponder, though, is the possibility 
of focusing very intensely and very sharply on the dullness, the painfulness, 
the frustration, and the suffering in our normal experiencing of the present, 
so that we may achieve a clear and limpid understanding of the ex­
periential process we arc normally caught in, and gain the insight and 
courage to rouse ourselves, to concentrate our mindfulness and learn 
how to open up the present, how to receive and enjoy the present with 
wisdom and trust and gratitude.
When we do get down to focusing on our patterning experience of 
temporality—focusing, that is, right now on the felt qualities we experience 
in (and as) the present—we may begin to understand how the past is 
progressively constituted in (and as) the experience of loss and resignation. 
(Consider Freud’s analysis of "object-loss,” here, and of our need to 
undergo a process of mourning. In The Ego and the Id, he says that "the 
character of the ego is a precipitate of abandoned object-cathexes and 
contains the history of those object-choices.”30 The passage of time, the 20
20 Sigmund Freud, Tht Ego and tht Id (New York: W. W. Norton, 1960), p. 19. See 
also Freud’s argument that the ego is both the product of anxiety and also what he calls 
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passing away (or death) of the present is a continuing lesson in the letting 
go of both pleasure and pain (non-attachment). The passage of time, so 
often a source of frustration, can in fact be worked with: it can actually 
teach us how to forget—and how to remember, too. (In his Dohds, the 
great Indian mahasiddha called Saraha gives helpful instructions in what 
he terms “non-memory.”21 Non-memory is not at all the forgetfulness 
of a lazy or absent-minded person, but rather the spontaneous, non­
fixated, non-resentful functioning of our innate capacity to preserve, 
return and recall.)
its "seat,” the source from which anxiety and its consequent frustrations are endlessly 
perpetuated. His argument is clearest in Inhibition, Symptom, and Anxiety (New York: 
W. W. Norton, 1976). An earlier edition with the same publisher (1963) bears a dif­
ferent title: The Problem of Anxiety.
21 See The Royal Song of Saraha. Translated with commentaries by Herbert 
V. Guenther (Berkeley: Shambhala Press, 1973).
22 For an excellent historical survey of “ontological insecurity” in the experiencing 
of time, I recommend Georges Poulet, Studiee in Human Time (Baltimore: The John 
Hopkins University Press, 1956). His interpretation of Descartes is especially exciting.
Likewise, when we focus on how we presently experience the protenden- 
tial (futural) dimensions of the present, if we focus on how we feel as 
the present opens outwards toward an uncertain future which, despite 
its unknowability, we always find already foreshadowed, then we may 
begin to realize how the present of the future (i.e., its presencing) is 
progressively constituted in (and as) the experience of imaginary ex­
pectancy. Such expectancy, however, can have many different motives. 
Thus, for example, it may be, primarily, a form of escape, a refusal to 
accept, or appreciate, the present of reality. Or it may be, primarily, 
a form of anxiety, an expression of a deep-seated insecurity. The present 
of the future is not to be trusted, though we can’t say why. But what 
matters is whether or not the exploratory attitude, the posture of an­
ticipation and inquiry, is properly balanced, properly centered, within 
the present. Sometimes, our exploration is mere distraction, like the 
frivolity of Kierkegaard’s “aesthete.” Sometimes, it is basically a deluded, 
paranoic attempt to solidify our situation, to fill in the holes in the net 
of time: even the slightest gap of uncertainty is unbearable; so excru­
ciatingly unbearable, in fact, that we prefer to be like a helpless fish, 
caught in the fisherman’s net.22 But the primordial presence, or im­
85
DAVID MICHAEL LEVIN
minence, of the absent future can be worked with. It presents us, right now, 
with an auspicious occasion to learn both trust and commitment. We 
can learn to trust ourselves, so that we develop the self-confidence and self- 
reliance we need in order to face the uncertainty of the future and confront 
what the future presents with skillful means. And we can learn resolute 
commitment, or focus, so that we develop the balance and ccnteredness 
that we need in order to stay with the present and open up its treasures. 
As we learn these attitudes and cultivate their intrinsic openness, we are 
able to go forward into the future precisely by fore-going the fictions of 
future pleasure and pain which tend, perpetually, to upset us, and to 
deny us the much deeper, much more fulfilling experience of abiding 
in, and with, the present. As Tarthang Tulku says, “The ‘going’ picture 
can be replaced with alternatives.”23 24*Because what appears to be our 
irreversible “movement” through a linear series of now-points is, in truth, 
a function of our own restless experiential pattemings.
23 Tarthang Tulku, Time, Space and Knowledge, pp. 105-106.
24 See Mario Manfredi, L'irrazionale vissuto (Bari: Dedalo Libri, 1972) for an analysis
of temporal experience in schizophrenia. Also consider Eugene Minkowski, Lived Time
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970); Harald Weinrich, Temfius: Besprochene
und Erzdhlu Welt (Stuttgart, 1964), Andr^ Jacob, Temps et langage (Paris, 1967) and 
William E. Bull, Time, Tense and the Verb (Berkeley, i960).
Opening the present
Ultimately, as the preceding diagnosis has implied, our temporal distress 
is rooted, not in the passage of the past as such nor in the uncertainties of 
the future as such, but always in the disposition with which we greet and 
experience the present.2* For it is the present, after all, which recedes 
from our reach and constitutes in its withdrawal that time we call “past.” 
Likewise, every future eventually comes forth in, and as, a present. Further­
more, it is in the present that the past, as past, is constituted, just as it is 
in the present that the future is constituted as future. So the present is indeed 
the experiential fulcrum on which our process of “enlightenment” pivots.
In Time, Space, and Knowledge, Tarthang Tulku argues that:
“ ‘Now’ and ‘two billion years from now’ are essentially the 
same time. They are both ‘here and now’ without their being 
involving existence, an exclusive and aggressive occupation of a 
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temporal niche. The partition that separates them is not one 
which constitutes a condition of temporal distance. We can open 
that partition.”25
29 Time, Space and Knowledge, p. 106.
29 Op. til., p. 142.
21 Op. til., p. 117. See also p. 122: “The dissatisfaction and helplessness we fed are 
definite signs that some principle vital to our being in the world has not yet been taken 
into account. We are controlled only to the degree that we allow ourselves to be by 
failing to confront all factors relevant to our existence.”
29 Op. til., p. 119.
29 Op. til., p. 121.
As Rinpoche states: “Essentially, what is needed is a more experi­
ential acquaintance with time.”25 Above all, we need to focus on, and 
give our thought to, the intrinsic, but perhaps not immediately obvious 
nature of the present, just as we ordinarily experience it. Then we may dis­
cover, much to our surprise, that, in his words:
Many different ways of viewing the world are available to us. 
Very precise and specialized views, theories, or models of 
reality are currently being defined according to our various 
perspectives. But none of these available models can provide 
a sufficient basis for fully confronting reality, and they often 
merely give theoretical confirmation to a common feeling of 
helplessness in the face of situations over which we ‘have no 
control? We need a different approach to confronting reality, 
which, aside from affording us a greater measure of theoretical 
accuracy, also facilitates the discovery of personal freedom and 
satisfaction.27
Attempting to make phenomenologically explicit the patternings of 
temporality as we ordinarily live (i.e., experience) them, Rinpoche points 
out that:
No empirical text can bear on the question of why ‘time passes? 
Yet everything in our realm, including our status as living and 
perceiving beings, depends on the ‘flow’ of time. We must 
pass from moment to moment.25
Perhaps this passage of time, which we experience as “compelling, inexor­
able, and merciless,”* 29 is really a function of our emotional patterning of 
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time. But if the painfulncss and frustration of our temporal experience is 
really a “psychophysical” function of our basic attitude toward existence, 
is it any wonder that so-called “empirical” (objective) investigations 
have proven to be so fruitless?
Rinpoche thus observes:
Commonly, time is thought of as a segmented tube extending 
into the future. But the transitoriness of the segments need not be 
taken as evidence of a serial process or of the reality and finiteness 
of such segments. Rather, transitoriness can be taken as the way 
in which Great Time dismantles or shakes off superficial 
constructs, in order to free us from clinging to a lower time view. 
With sufficient sensitivity, transitional views may then emerge 
which do not accept lower time as the only reality. Then all 
emphasis on such superficial partitions dividing time can be 
relaxed, and the whole tube-like picture of time (whether 
segmented or not) may collapse.30
30 Op. cd., p. 105. My italics.
31 Op. cd., p. 207.
In what does this special “sensitivity” consist? And how may we 
develop it? What is the “experiential acquaintance with time” which 
Rinpoche tries to encourage? Stated succinctly, the practices he recom­
mends arc processes of experiential openness and unfolding:
By opening ourselves up to ‘time,’ it can act and speak more 
freely through us. Our speech and gestures become totally 
irrepressible and spontaneous, welling up from 'time,*  the 
dynamic center of our being. Everything we are and do becomes 
a direct and overtly faithful expression of the inner structure of 
of'time*  itself.31
This description lucidly conveys the phenomenological (i.e., purely lived) 
character of temporal experience liberated from the painful pattemings 
that prevail in our samsaric existence. But, of course, we still have not 
heard how to prepare ourselves for such a dramatic experiential shift.
This instruction we cannot really hear, however, until we have fully 
conceded the “absence” of (or our absent-minded absence from) the 
present—fully conceded, that is, that we are normally closed to the offering 
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of the present. Somehow, because of our attachments, our cravings, 
aversions, re-presentations and egological stories; or because of dullness 
and absent-mindedness, we normally miss it. We are unmindful, un­
focused. But, on closer inspection, we may discover, much to our chagrin 
and bewilderment, that the conditions of normal life “actually require 
that time be ignored. We relegate time to the status of a stable back­
ground within which objects and identities arc preserved intact.”32 
(Let us note, here, that in Sein und Zeil, Heidegger analyzed how our 
experiencing of time tends to become fixated, or frozen, into a figure/ 
ground patterning which he called Vor-handen-sein: the being of time 
reduced to a stable readiness, degraded to mere “stock.”)
For Rinpoche, the intensification of awareness can, by itself and quite 
spontaneously, deconstruct these egological patterns:
If, on the other hand, we appreciate ‘time’ more, then all 
things and situations are seen as ‘timed out.’ When seen in this 
way, our encounters with things challenge, rather than presuppose, 
their general, stable identities and their founding background.55
To the degree that we are egolessly open, experientially open, to the 
presencing and granting of time, “each situation is, at least potentially, 
through its [implicit and primordial] connection to Great Time, infinite 
or all-embracing.”54
But we must return to the question: why do we not experience our­
selves within the embrace of “Great Time”? And how, more specifically, 
can we respond to, and work with, the present? Let us consider once 
again, our normal experiential process. Instead of focusing our awareness 
and gathering our concentration in an attitude of appreciative mind­
fulness, we ek-sist in painful or unfulfilling dispersal (ek-stasis). But this 
“absent-minded” dispersal of energies, this scattering, is not an authentic, 
beneficial, and truly ecstatic, or blissful, openness. Rather, it is a com­
pulsive, perhaps even obsessive (karmic) preoccupation with loss or gain, 
presence or absence: a willful containment within temporal partitions (dis­
tances, postponements, departures, etc.), felt to be fixed, final, and closed. 
This attitude, however, inevitably threatens to reduce the present, to fix
32 Op. cit., p. 193.




it within the meaninglessness of a now-point, chained in irreoasible, linear 
order to an extensive series of such pointless points. Instead of “presence 
of mind,” a deeply meaningful and meaningfully deep experiencing of 
the present, we are upset, thrown off center. We lose the wonderful 
balance of the present, which is the present of balance, the present of 
health and sanity. Wc are held in the thrall of a past wc cannot let be; 
or we lean over the abyss of an unfathomable future into which our way 
of experiencing the present (either anxiety over the impermanence and 
vulnerability and uncertainty of what attracts us or else aversiveness 
toward what it offers) may at any point violently throw us. We must learn 
to give up every form of attachment, especially our attachment to the 
future, whether it be in the nature of desire (fascination) or aversion 
(hostility), or even merely the assumption of a hope which encourages us 
to postpone, or defer, accepting and responding to the present. (The 
future is present right now. So is the past. If this seems very strange, or 
paradoxical, let us say, simply, that the presence of the past and future, 
our experience of the fact that they arc present, is a gracious and wonderful 
gift: in brief, a present. Thus, it cannot be willed: it can only be received 
and enjoyed. Consider Proust’s so-called “mhnoire inoolontaire”: the capacity, 
which is amazing, certainly, and yet intrinsically so simple, to enjoy 
the spontaneous presenting of past experiences.)
But how do wc learn non-attachment ? Letting-go (Heidegger’s 
Gelassenheit) is not easy: it is not a “result” we can will. Wilfullness, which 
is just another entanglement, must finally give way, as Heidegger says, to 
an attitude of willingness. Finally, it is a question of how we respond to 
the present. Here I want to suggest that the appropriate response is 
openness, understood, more concretely, as opening the present. But we 
need to say more about this openness than that it is a more “neutralized” 
attitude towards past and future (less tenacity, less anxiety, less blind 
craving and yearning). This is helpful, but not helpful enough.
So I propose that we analyze the process of non-attachment (“equa­
nimity”) into three “stages”: (i) concentration in the present (mind­
fulness, attentiveness, being-where-we-arc),35 (2) focusing on the present, 
” Heidegger’s word for “human being” is Da-inn: “being-therc”. But, whereas 
Heidegger’s interpretation of this word emphasizes our existential situatedness (Bt- 
findlichkeit), I would like to stress its conccntrative meaning, its Zen-like reminder of our 
intrinsic need for situational mindfulness. How often are wc really present, really “right 
there”?
90
PAINFUL TIME, ECSTATIC TIME
and (3) opening the present. The first “stage” involves developing a 
certain concentration of energy: deliberately, and with progressive skill, 
we learn to stay in, and with, the present. As the Zen masters of old 
liked to say: When I am eating, I eat; when I am sitting, I sit; when I am 
walking, I walk. This present, right now, is the time when the precious 
gift of the whole of Time comes forth and is granted us. This time is the 
time when the gift is really present, rather than absent (as when the event 
of granting is isolated and partitioned, and regarded simply as past or 
still to come). So this present (the present time) is very precious; it 
is of decisive, pivotal importance, and should not be refused, despised, 
denied or ignored. Our well-being essentially depends on our capacity 
to receive and cherish the present, and enjoy its challenge—or its op­
portunities. What the present offers will not always be pleasant or easy 
to accept. Even so, the most skillful way of turning it to our advantage, 
or at least a situation not completely devoid of positive meaningfulness, 
is to accept it, concentrate on working it, and do whatever needs to be, 
and can be, done. However disagreeable the situation in which we may 
find ourselves, we only make it worse when, instead of accepting it as the 
“partner” we have been granted to work with, we refuse and avoid it. 
Every situation in which we find ourselves is a challenge, and an auspicious 
occasion to find ourselves.
The second “stage,” involving the skillful therapeutic technique of what 
Dr. Eugene Gendlin calls “focusing,” both deepens and clarifies our 
concentration, our mindfulness.56 In focusing, we question, listen for, 
and listen to our bodily feelings, letting them spontaneously arise from 
the centers of bodily energy (chakras), and move toward getting a basic 
feeling for the whole meaning (whole configuration) of our situation. This 
develops a vital sense of proportion, a sense of perspective; and it brings 
with it not only a certain clarity and accuracy of self-understanding, 
meaningfully rooted in our bodily-centered feelings, but also a crucial 
realization of our intrinsic capacity to cope, to deal effectively and 
skillfully with our present situation.
’* Sec footnote 10, supra. On the experiential qualities of openness in the context of 
personality change, see Carl Rogers, On Becoming a Person (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Co., 1961), especially pp. 73-196 and 347"359-
Focusing, however, will be counterproductive, and perhaps even 
destructive, unless it is “perfected,” so to speak, within a third stage: 
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the stage, namely, of process openness. We must learn how to focus with 
concentration, but also openly, and without fixation. Without such 
openness, focusing works like a cookie cutter: it cuts out a figure and 
sharply abstracts it from its vitality-sustaining ground. Focusing will 
then reinforce “inveterate tendencies” (Tibetan: bag-chags] Sanskrit: 
vdsana) toward narrow-mindedness, rigidity, and a prejudgemental 
or dogmatic posture. Focusing needs, rather, to be a process akin to dip­
ping our cupped hands into the water of a lively stream and lifting 
some up for a drink. In other words, focusing needs to be a means of 
refreshment', thus, we will “lift up” a felt meaning (Gendlin’s phrase) 
into the light of explicitation, but take care not to uproot this configuration 
of meaning from the vitality of the feeling-process which grounds and 
sustains all potentialities for meaningfulness.
Focusing must take place in a certain “stillness” or “silence.” It needs 
to be undergone in an attitude of affective receptivity that really is not 
a mode of passive resignation, but rather a sort of lively, alert readiness 
to listen, to learn, and to undergo experiential change. The energies 
present in the chakras, which are fundamentally centers of bodily feeling, 
are profoundly meaningful; and, if we are willing to listen, to create for 
them a certain stillness, a space, a clearing (Heidegger’s word is Lichtung), 
then we may hear the sounds of their own “speech.” These elementary 
soundings, these sensuous, bodily modulations resonant with sound sense, 
convey a very accurate primordial wisdom. The openness of focusing 
helps us to get in touch with what is really happening, what is really 
going on. The situation at least makes sense. Spontaneously, then, it 
generates, or induces, the appropriate response.
Openness “perfects” the process of non-attachment, which begins with 
concentration, moves, with focusing, into the “Stage of Development,” 
and reaches the “Fulfillment Stage” with open, non-dualistic expansion. 
Expansive openness makes it possible for the present to grant us the whole 
presence of Time: an expanding wholeness, or self-sufficiency, in the very 
presence of the present. (This is not, by the way, a demal of absence: 
the past is past, and the future has yet to come. But the point is that, once 
we have attained the openness of non-duality, our bliss is such that 
the absence of the absent is enjoyed for what it is, along with the presence 
of what is present.) Then, indeed, the fullness of the present, its treasury 
of presents, will be opened up.
In the present, we harvest ripened fruits, presents from the past, and we 
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conceal new seeds in the earth, presents which will come forth to us 
in a present from out of the future. Not only do we immediately enjoy 
the present (i.e., enjoy it without defensive representations, whether 
aversive or aggressive) as the present of past and future; but we discover, 
in this present, a treasury of wonderful presents of meaningfulness: realms 
and depths of meaningfulness, some “pleasant” and some not, which 
immediately open up to us so soon as we ourselves open up, through thought­
ful concentration and skillfully focused awareness, to the whole of the 
present. What matters, ultimately, is not whether our experiences are 
“pleasant” or “unpleasant” in some standard sense, but whether or not 
they are felt to be existentially meaningful. And this requires, as Gendlin has 
argued, that we feel such experiences to belong to a life in which they 
are continuously reintegrated into new, and thus changing, interpre­
tive contexts. Experiencing the present without the egological defenses 
of re-presentation, we will be able to feel the reality of the present; and 
it will be very satisfying, very fulfilling, very complete and whole in 
its significance.
We may even want to speak, cautiously, of “timelessness.” Well, time 
is certainly passing, passing away; but we are not overwhelmed, not ex­
ceedingly disturbed, not threatened: we will feel that we “did what we 
did.” We really “lived” the present, wholeheartedly responded to the 
challenge of its invitation, and “completed” our participation in its mo­
ment, now past, of meaningfully felt-through presence.37 Wc may feel 
some regret; but we feel it without its normal quality of painfully com­
pulsive craving. Wc are not entrapped, for example, in the feeling that 
we left something undone, something we “now” (in a subsequent now) 
must repeat in order to complete. This is not to deny our experience of 
time passing. Nor is it to deny the horizonal absence, not only of the past, 
but also of the future. On the contrary. This experience of “timelessness,” 
with which we, or rather our gestures, conduct, and doings may be 
graced, in varying degrees of clarity and intensity, and also in proportion 
to the nature and quality of our openness, is not at all a denial, or refusal, 
of the temporal ek-stasis, the tripartite “vectoriality” of time, but rather 
the felt meaningfulness of its final acceptance. We acknowledge the presence of 
37 In Gestalt Therapy; Excitement and Growth in the Human Personality (New York: 
Delta Books, 1951), the authors (Frederick Peris, Ralph Hefferline and Paul Goodman) 
call this “leaving no unfinished business."
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the “abyss,” the openness we cannot fix and claim, the impermanence, 
or ultimate nothingness, of the present situation: we learn a holistic 
attitude which enables us to be very clear and accurate about the nature 
of the present, and to experience its meaningfulness in an appropriately 
effective way.
This effectiveness is worthy of note. As our concentration and mind­
fulness progressively balance us and center us in the present, and as our 
attachments to the past and future correspondingly vanish, like the fog 
of the night with the rising of the sun, we find it not only easier, but 
also more meaningful, to attend wholeheartedly to the situation we find 
ourselves in “at present.” Such attentiveness, however, makes it progres­
sively easier to vanquish our absentmindedness and de-centering at­
tachments to the past and future, attachments of desire and aversion, 
since each present, while and as present, is (more or less) effectively dealt with. 
Thus, when it withdraws into the past, we need feel no distress: nothing 
that “should have been done” (as we say so often) was left undone. Like­
wise, we need not attach ourselves, with hope or anxiety, to the non- 
being of the future, since, in working with the present, our self-reliance 
has been strengthened, and we may trust ourselves to respond more satis­
factorily to whatever presents come forth from out of our unknowable 
future.
Obsessive attachments disseminate our energies in frustrating and 
unfulfilling ways. They make it virtually impossible to deal effectively 
with our situation. Concentrated focusing, however, re-collects these scat­
tered energies and gathers them into the wholeness, or fullness, of the 
present. Such concentration, however, is experientially very different 
from the narrow-mindedness of an attitude which we will recognize 
at once in the familiar phrases, “living for the moment” and “living in 
(and for) the here-and-now.” For what these phrases denote is an attitude 
which is the very denial of openness. Such an attitude involves a reduction 
of the present to a fictitious point of nowness. Where, then, is the mean­
ingful richness, be it “pain” or “pleasure,” which the present would grant 
us? Deprived of its passing away (I mean to embrace, here, though 
we cannot discuss it further, the disquieting hermeneutical experiencing 
of old traditions) and bereft of its promise, its ecstatic vitality, the present 
is no longer very precious. So concentration must be a focusing which 
is profoundly open, a focusing which receives and opens up the present, 
a focusing which frees the flowing of the present from our fixations. There 
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is, then, an expansion of awareness, a deepening of satisfaction, a mean­
ingful opening up. Aspects of our present situation now present themselves 
for our appreciation; new and unnoticed aspects may emerge. We find 
our understanding to be more “realistic,” more effective, and more fruit­
ful; yet it is also, at the same time, rather less vulnerable to frustration 
and other forms of samsaric suffering.
What mystics (for example, accomplished yogins practicing the 
Mahdmudrd}**  have often wanted to call “timelessncss” is just this open­
ness, this experiential concentration which does not need to fixate the 
flow (the passage) of time, to protect us against the experience of absence: 
absence of the past, absence of the future. Openness to the future, for 
example, is then not at all a predictive omniscience; not at all an occult 
power of “clairvoyance.” The Buddha’s so-called “knowledge of past, 
present, and future” is indeed a wonderful and extraordinary human 
accomplishment. But there is no need to glorify its difficulty and rarity 
by regarding it as a feat of magic: as if it were some sort of occult cognitive 
power that must defy scientific explanation and experiential under­
standing. The Buddha’s knowledge is “simply” the ecstatic (blissful) 
wisdom which comes from understanding how to live comfortably and 
meaningfully in the “flux” of time: how fittingly to experience, and 
work with, the never-ending temporal ek-stasis of samsaric ex-sisUnce. 
His knowledge is a wisdom which frees him from repetitions of, and at­
tachments to, the past, and which frees him, likewise, from hopes and 
anxieties that cling to the future. His knowledge is a wisdom which, thus 
freed, enables him to concentrate serenely on the present, so that the 
beneficent presence of the past and the present opportunities for receiving 
the future are not missed, but fully appreciated. His knowledge is the 
wisdom of feelings, attuned to the essentially open nature of temporal 
experience. His knowledge of temporality is an experiential wisdom which 
effectively liberates him from the karmic wheel of endless pain, suffering 
and frustration. To experience the present of such liberation is to ex­
perience the ecstasy of ek-statie temporality. Opening the present, we 
may really be able to discover, and inhabit, the vectorial whole of Time.39
*• See Herbert V. Guenther, The Life and Teaching of Nirofia (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1963), pp. 222-235. Also consider pp. 162 and 186. Nfiropa’s breathtak­
ing Mahimudra is said to span and embrace the whole of time, for he was capable of 
experiencing past, present and future without any defensive partitioning.




“We are literally,” as Rinpoche says, “timing ourselves away.”40 Such 
is the temporal fate of samsaric consciousness. “Death is a totally opaque 
partition. We cannot see beyond it, nor can we see it clearly enough to 
discover other options or ways around it.”41 Thus, as he asserts: “Death 
is the ultimate lesson presented by ‘time,’ exposing the bankruptcy of our 
[ordinary and accustomed] view.”42 To speak rather bluntly, the fact 
of the matter is that, in a certain sense, we “kill” ourselves. Our experienc­
ing of time, our way of patterning the presencing and passage of time, is 
responsible for the fact that our lives are fatefully thrown into the terrible 
powers of Death.
40 Tarthang Tulku, Time, Space, and Knowledge, p. 127.
41 Ibid.
43 Op. ciL, p. 128.
43 Montaigne, op. at., Book I: 20: p. 62. See also pp. 57-61.
44 Jean Paul Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego (New York: Noonday Press, 1957), 
p. 40. See also pp. 60-68 and 70-83 for a brilliant discussion of how we attempt to root 
and secure our emotional “states” in patterns of temporality.
We dimly sense that there may be a “way out.” What about the at­
titude of resignation espoused by the Stoics? Montaigne tells us that 
familiarity can diminish the terror of death: “I haved formed the habit 
of having death continually present, not merely in my imagination, but 
in my mouth.”43 Living towards one’s death (Heidegger’s Sein-zum-Tode), 
we are living with death. But once we recognize the intimate presence of 
death in the very shadow which constantly stalks our earthly embodiment, 
perhaps we can begin to experience an even more intimate, and even less 
“negative,” relationship with our own death. Heidegger’s concern is 
centered around the insight that, in heightening our awareness in, 
through, and as being-towards-dcath, we may learn to dwell in the whole 
of Time, progressively deepening and expanding our interpolation, as 
it were, into the textures of the Book of Time. But, until we have so 
intimately embraced our own death that we surrender every possible defense, 
including “resignation," against the pressure of its presence, can we say that 
we are really open to the present which presents the whole of Time?
In the Transcendence of the Ego, Sartre proclaims that “The transcen­
dental ego is the death of consciousness.”44 Buddhist experience supports 
his insight. So long as we cannot recognize, or cannot accept, the death 
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of our Ego, and thus, too, the incessant interplay between birth and death 
in, and as, the nature of our experiential processes, arc we not main­
taining our defenses by seeking refuge from death within the stronghold 
of the Ego? The Ego’s only function, ultimately, is to preserve, by re­
presentation, the “comfortable” illusion of “continuity,” of “solidity,” 
in the face of dying and birth.
Blaise Pascal tells us that “The eternal silence of these infinite spaces 
frightens me.”44 5 *But is he frightened by the openness of merely exterior 
spaces? Are there not also certain interior spaces, spaces of non-being, 
of anonymity, spaces which are inhabited by the silence of death, and of 
which he was even more frightened? The Ego functions as a system of 
defense to fill in, or conceal, by means of its re-presentations, the “gaps” 
which seem, for egologual reflection, to interrupt personal identity and to 
erase the signature of our pride. Every experiential process, however, is, 
as such, a process involving the experience of change, impermanence, birth, 
and death. As Merleau-Ponty states, in a phenomenological description 
which corresponds precisely to the analysis of the skandhas in the 
Abhidharmaf*  an ancient text on the epistemology of Indian Buddhism: 
“Each sensation, being, strictly speaking, the first, last and only of its 
kind, is a birth and a death. The subject who experiences it begins and 
ends with it... .”47 This, a truth about our experience which her­
meneutical phenomenology brings to light, needs to be correlated with 
the biophysical fact, the objective scientific truth, that the human body 
consists of cells which are involved in a continuous process of birth-and- 
death transformations.48 Lest the significance of these points for the 
status of the Ego be missed, we should heed Merleau-Ponty’s observation 
that “Every perception takes place in an atmosphere of generality and 
is presented to us anonymously.”49 And he adds:
44 Pascal, op. cit., section 206, p. 6i. See also section 194, p. 55.
56 See Herbert V. Guenther, Philosophy and Psychology in the Abhidhavma (Berkeley: 
Shambhala, 1974) and Buddhist Philosophy in Theory and Practice (Boulder: Shambhala,
>976).
47 Merleau-Ponty, op. cit., p. a 16.
*• Phenomenology must be hermeneutical, since human experience is errant and self- 
deceptive. The Tibetans speak of ma-rig-pa, or “loss of pristine cognitiveness,*’ thus 
interpreting the Sanskrit notion of aoidyd.
49 Op. cit., p. 215.
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So if I wanted to render precisely the perceptual experience, 
I ought to say that one perceives in me, not that I perceive. Every 
sensation carries within it the germ of a dream of depersonaliza­
tion, such as we experience in that quasi-stupor to which we 
are reduced when we really try to live at the level of sensation.30
In this regard, it might be worthwhile to stray somewhat from the 
main argument of this paper, in order to ponder, from the standpoint 
of Ego, the significance of the overthrow, thanks to Gestalt psychology, 
of the once unassailable “constancy hypothesis.” According to the 
hypothesis of classical Western psychology, it was supposed that there 
is a fixed conformity, or a co-ordination, element for element, between 
external stimuli and the organism’s sensations. “Hence,” in the words 
of Aron Gurwitsch, “if the same neural element (for example, a circum­
scribed region of the retina) is repeatedly stimulated in the same manner, 
the same sensation will arise each time.”51 Thus, in brief, stimuli are 
construed atomistically as invariably local in nature. It was also supposed 
that, whenever sensations differed, the difference would be due only 
and exclusively to a difference in stimuli. But Gestalt psychology demon­
strated, once and for all, that, contrary to expectations based on the 
constancy hypothesis, there was an “absence of stimuli corresponding to 
Gestalt-qualities.”92 For example:
If I hear a melody ... if I perceive geometrical figures, compare 
the lengths of two lines or the brightnesses of two colors, the 
impression of the melody, [the] musical interval, the figure, the 
differences of lengths or of brightnesses, all constitute an enrich­
ment of perception which has no additional stimulus corresponding 
to it. Whether or not the difference of brightness between 
two shades of color is noticed, the stimuli are not thereby 
altered—hence, neither are the excitations produced by them 
nor the elementary sensations corresponding to them.93
’• Ibid.
31 “Aspects of Gestalt Psychology,” in Aron Gurwitsch, Studies in Phenomenology and 
Psychology (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. 5. Also see “The Phe­
nomenological and the Psychological Approach to Consciousness,” op. til., pp. 101-106.
“ Ibid.
33 Op. at., p. 11. My italics.
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Now, the point I want to make is that, once we abandon the constancy 
hypothesis, so crucial to the methodology of classical (and basically 
behavioristic) psychology, we may then discover that there are many changes 
in environmental stimuli which do not bring about any noticeable changes, or 
shifts, in our sensory, or perceptual, experience. Gurwitsch was interested only 
in the fact that there could be certain experiential changes—essentially 
the effect of Gestalt perceptions—to which no elementary stimuli cor­
responded. But the abandonment of the constancy hypothesis also cleared 
the way for the discovery that we have a strong tendency not to notice 
(experience) stimulus-changes unless they are very abrupt or otherwise 
outstanding. In other words, we tend to “impose” on our perceptions a certain 
constancy and stability and permanence.
I suggest that this effect is partly related to the defensive functioning of 
the Ego. Undoubtedly, this tendency docs serve a necessary protective 
function. But it could continue to function in this way without being as 
defensive and as aversive as it is when under the sway of the Ego. Our attitude 
“colors” our perception; it makes a difference. Accordingly we ask: 
What would our perceptual experience be like, to the degree that it 
was no longer filtered through the inverterate re-presentational habits 
of Ego ? Would not our perceptual experience become much richer, much 
more vibrant, more resonant, more multi-dimensional, more meaningful, 
more fulfilling? These are important questions—questions to which a 
profound tradition of Buddhist psychology, if it aspires to respond to 
the challenge of Western science, still needs to address itself.
Human life is, in essence, a transitory local gathering and enclosing 
of elemental energies, condensed, unified, and solidified into the form of 
a human body. Death, from this standpoint, is simply the return of 
these energies to their original dispersal in the openness of Being. Ego, 
then, is the illusion of a solid personal continuity that resists the ecstatic 
experience of (its) death. But, bearing in mind what Freud discovered 
about the Ego, namely, as we said earlier, that it is simultaneously the 
product of anxiety and also, once firmly established, the ongoing source 
of anxiety, we must begin to penetrate the depths of our delusion, in order 
to see very clearly that, although the Ego does indeed exist in order 
to provide a defense against death, it is the Ego’s very own anxiety which 
accounts for the origin of what we call “death.” For the Ego’s anxiety is 
responsible for the patterning and partitioning (Sanskrit, kalpana', Tibetan, 
rtog-pa) which prevent us from living in, and enjoying, the wholesome 
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whole of Time. The Ego is responsible for the fact that we experience death 
as a terrible, meaningless event of total annihilation, coming at, and as, the 
end of our life. Such is the crazy dialectic of the samsaric Ego: in the 
beginning, our anxiety “creates” the partitioning we experience, through 
Ego, as "death”; in the middle, Ego recoils from a terror which we 
fail to tinderstand as of our own making; and, in the end, we utterly fail, 
of course, in our attempt to defend ourselves against the threat of death 
by concealing it in every way we can. Thus it happens that, as Heidegger 
rightly insists, we mortals live out our lives inauthentically and without 
great joy.
But there is no absolute, substantial Self, or Ego, whose personal 
identity could stand, transcendentally, outside the experience of the 
“streaming” of Time. So it is precisely by learning how to stand within 
Time, how to accept and joyfully embrace the ek-static temporality of our 
human condition, that we may some day achieve the ecstasy of a certain 
“timelessness.” For the experience of such “timelessness” does not arise 
in (or as) a willful denial of time, nor will it come to reward us for seeking 
the refuge of a transcendental Ego outside the field of Time. It arises, 
rather, only when we begin—joyfully—to accept the present of Time, 
which is nothing other than the experience of abiding openness.
Heidegger’s discussion of being-towards-death is very helpful. But, 
from the Buddhist standpoint, it articulates only the beginning of the 
process of experiential liberation and openness. Is there no experiential 
shift, or change, once we have “resolutely” plumbed the depths of 
existential anxiety and begun really to live our being toward death? 
The arduous path of Buddhism certainly begins with an intensification 
of existential anxiety and a sharpening of the experience of being-toward- 
death. (Traditionally, in fact, cemeteries and cremation grounds were 
strongly recommended as places for Buddhist novices to meditate.) But 
the path of Enlightenment winds and turns, eventually leaving the ex­
perience of anxiety in the face of death very far behind. To live our lives 
as being-toward-death requires that we experience the embrace of death 
so closely, so intimately, that it finally dissolves the imagined “solidity” 
of the Ego. And, with the passing away of the Ego, the oppressive par­
titions into which it forced the timing (Heidegger: Zeiiigung) of “Great 
Time” also dissolve. According to esoteric traditions, this is experienced 
as a passage through death. Only with the death of the Ego are we 
utterly defenceless against, and thus truly opened towards, the meaningful
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event (for Heidegger, the Ereignis} of our ownmost death. Once we have 
moved beyond Ego and have begun to experience our life as a movement 
toward the event of our own death, wc may begin to find, much to our 
surprise, that, when the resolute appropriation of death “takes place” 
within this attitude of openness, death itself—the terrible partner, that is, 
with which the Ego danced, and which was, in reality, but a projection 
or reflection, of the Ego’s unknowingness—undergoes a profoundly felt 
shift in meaning. Death may then be experienced, not with dread but with 
joy, as the glorious portal of light, through which we will painlessly pass 
into the open embrace of Being.3* In birth, passing through the opened 
door of the womb, we open into the human world. In death, we simply 
pass through another door and enter what we imagine to be a different 
world. Birth and death are ultimately the same: opening into the openness 
of Time and Space.
54 Sec Francesca Fremantle and Chogyam Trungpa (translators and editors), Ttu 
Tibetan Book of the Dead: The Great Liberation Through Hearing in the Bardo (Berkeley: 
Shambhala, 1975).
99 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 69. The two immediately following 
quotations come from the same page.
9* Time, Space, and Knowledge, p. 126.
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Eternity
In his discussion of temporality, Merleau-Ponty states that “past time is 
wholly collected up and grasped in the present.”54 5 Furthermore, “with 
my past, I have the horizon of futurity which surrounds it, and thus 
I have my actual present seen as the future of that past.” And likewise, 
“with the imminent future, I have the horizon of past which will surround 
it, and therefore my actual present as the past of that future.”
Now, in Time, Space and Knowledge, Rinpoche writes:
Insofar as the ego is self-protective and reluctant to surrender 
itself to permit the expression of a wider focal setting, ordinary 
time conforms to the ego’s restrictions.56
In consequence,
Time’s ‘flow*  is arranged in an orderly way corresponding 
to what has been experienced or presupposed—and what has 
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been repressed and avoided—regarding the founding dimen­
sions of reality.* ’
57 Ibid.
58 Op. at., p. 128.
99 Op. cit., p. 160.
60 Op. fit., p. 171.
61 On Time and Being (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 13-14. This is a transla­
tion from Zur Saehe des Dertkens (Ttibingen: Neimeyer, 1969), pp. 13-14.
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The truth of the matter is, as he says, that,
We have little capacity for opening to the infinity that ‘time*  
really offers and communicates. We do not let satisfaction be 
a reality. We try always to achieve it in the future, to capture it 
and tie it down.57 8 *
But despite such inveterate tendencies, there is time for an experiential 
shift:
Whether or not we are marked out and cut off by endless 
partitioning, or can see partitions as not obscuring a fundamental 
intimacy and fulfillment, is simply a matter of which view is 
taken. We can use the (ordinarily obscuring) partitioning 
tendency of time in new ways, gradually penetrating the walls 
that seal us off. Or we can awaken directly to Great Time.”
Now, as long as we experience ourselves as, and thus remain, in his 
words, “trapped ‘in time’ we see things, differences, distances, [and 
deferments], but not the ‘timing’ which gives them.”60 (In Being and 
Time, and subsequently, in Time and Being, Heidegger makes essentially 
the same point. According to him, man “always remains approached 
continually by the presencing of something actually present without 
explicitly heeding the presencing [the Ereignis, the occurrence] 
itself.”)61 Rinpoche develops it nicely:
The self [or Ego] cannot understand Great Space or Time 
because it is, precisely, the [very] embodiment of a lapse of 
such understanding. The self appreciates and deals with the 
‘infinity*  of Space [and Time] only in the sense that it finds it 
possible to continue its ordinary knowing encounters indefinitely 
[i.e., seriatim]. It can know an ‘infinity*  of data, but without
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getting any insight into its own Space-Time nature or into 
the reason why that infinity of detail is available to it.62
62 Op. di., p. 166.
63 Op. di., p. 170. In Transcendence of the Ego, Sartre argues in favor of a similar point 
44 Martin Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking (New York: Harper & Row 1966). In
this text, originally published in German under the title Gelassenheit, Heidegger gives 
us what may well be his dearest diagnosis of the pathological nature of the bond be­
tween the Ego, understood as “will,’* and re-presentation, which is an objectifying 
process that involves fixation, aversive distancing, temporal postponement and delay, 
and inevitably, of course, the frustrations that are so typical of samsaric existence.
65 Time, Space, and Knowledge, p. 170.
44 Op. cit., p. 176.
Although, as he states, “The self or subject is really an object timed 
out by time,’’63 the self we maintain blocks us off from undergoing an 
opening experience of this Great Time which times us. Heidegger argues 
very convincingly, for example, in his Conversation on a Country Path, 
that this blocking off, this obscuration or concealment, is a function of 
our calculative and re-presentational mode of thinking (experiencing).64 
According to him, this mode of thinking (experiencing) involves, in effect, 
a fixation of the dynamic figure/ground Geslaitung, such that we do not 
let the “« gibt” (the “it gives,” or, with equal sense, the “there is”), 
for example, the timing (Heidegger: “tcmporalizing”) of Time, be what, 
and as, it is. In truth, "Great Time is the self. But the self cannot fathom 
Time.”65 (In his Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant comes to this 
very same insight. But I submit that he failed to consider its experiential 
consequences for our lives.)
For the person who has passed through the death of the Ego and found 
himself abiding not in the irreversible, linear movement of a punctiform 
present, but in the temporal openness of being, the meaning of psy­
chophysical death is very different. (Our normal “intentional directcd- 
ness” is responsible, in fact, for an indwelling patterning of Time that, as 
Tarthang Tulku says, “impoverishes the present and gives rise to real, 
sequential, ordinary time—guaranteeing the emergence of further im­
poverished, but ‘real’ moments.”)66 To be sure, it is not a question of 
transmigration, or of an afterlife: these are mythopoeic symbols which 
once spoke with the power of conviction, but which now need to be 
hermeneutically deconstructed in relationship with our meditative ex­
perience. The human organism, the one I am experientially and with
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which I identify myself, is destined to die, as we say, at the end of my 
life. But this death can be experienced in two “moods”: either in the 
mood of the Ego’s attachments (anxiety, hope, desire, and aversion) or 
in that of openness (non-duality). Either as the sort of dispersal (diversion, 
ek-stasis, and what Heidegger calls “forgetfulness”: in Tibetan, ma-rig-pa) 
of which Pascal, in the passage cited earlier, solemnly warned us; or as a 
dissemination of cognitive energies which returns to openness the “ele­
ments” of our being, the basic elemental energies which we gathered 
together and concentrated, for the duration of a “life-time,” into the 
worldly semblance of solidity, greed, and willfulness—in brief, the many- 
storied, delusory manifestation which is Ego. So the basic point is that 
this gathering, this re-collection (akin to Plato’s anamnesis) takes place 
again and again, and not only from the “subjective” standpoint of an 
awareness, a knowingness, liberated from the delusions and masks of Ego, 
but also from the “objective” standpoint of biochemistry.
Accepting this process of concentration (re-collection) and ek-static 
temporal dehiscence as the very play of being, we may experientially 
transcend our pressing enclosure within the defensive narrowness and 
fixation of Ego. We can open up. Merleau-Ponty writes: “The memory 
or the voice is recovered [like a gift.) when the body once more opens 
itself to others or to the past, when it opens the way to co-existence and 
once more . .. acquires significance beyond itself.”67 Only by for-getting 
our past, i.e., giving up our attachment to it, can we open up to get 
(receive) it again, spontaneously granted to us as a gift, or present, of 
Great Time. Thus, ek-static (i.e., temporal) openness may even grant 
us the capacity to experience what, from an ordinary point of view, we 
might call the reversibility of the time flow, since our non-attachment 
releases cognitive energies, thereby facilitating spontaneous recollections, 
such as Proust’s mtmoire involontaire, as well as the clear and accurate 
imaginative insights into the future which traditionally have been called, 
but with the most naive misunderstanding and confusion, the skill 
of “clairvoyance.” (There is no such skill, not even among bodhisattvas 
and mahasiddhas. What these marvelous beings do enjoy, however, is a 
presence of mind which enables them to comprehend our future in light 
of what is already manifest, actually and virtually, in the fullness of the 
present.)
IO4
•7 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 165. My italics.
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It may be tempting to liken such openness to the experience of abiding 
in what the Western tradition is wont to call “Eternity?’ But this temp­
tation needs to be carefully and critically examined. Like the notion of 
transmigration (“afterlife”), the notion of Eternity is suspiciously attrac­
tive. Indeed, the Ego embraces “Eternity” with great pleasure. Merleau- 
Ponty is therefore in accord with the Mddhyamika teachings, which, by way 
of the notion of pratityasamutpdda (“dependent origination,” or con­
textual Gestalt relatedncss), ruthlessly deconstructs every fantasy-construct 
of the Ego. Thus, he argues that, although this notion may initially be of 
help in freeing us from a certain worldly constriction of vision, it will, 
ultimately, block us off from “the infinite openness of those fields 
of presence.”6* So long as we hold on to the dream of dwelling in Eternity, 
wc are still in the thrall of egological anxiety: our Sein-zum-Tode is con­
stituted by, and as, the mood of anxiety, rather than in a temporal 
ecstasy which has even surrendered the partitions of attachment that ground 
our conceptualizations of primordially open experience. “Eternity” is 
just another representation, another hiding place for Ego. It is a reflection, 
or echo, of our need to solidify and ensure our position, to objectify it, 
when we are confronted, due to our own confusion, with the terror of 
openness. Perhaps the terror is so abysmal that we cannot expect to 
destroy completely its existential roots. Still, we can dismantle many of 
our old defenses. In this regard, moreover, it should be recalled that, for 
Freud, the “primary processes” (i.e., freely flowing libidinal energies, 
belonging to the earliest psychic stage) are “timeless?’ Or, better: they 
testify to our incarnation and participation in the primordial Time of 
non-duality (non-repression), and their timelessness strongly suggests 
that the timing we get caught up in is simply the tension, in duality, 
between Ego-desire and Ego-fulfillment.
When we reach a stage of openness where the “ontic” facts of birth 
and death, and the perpetual interplay of dying and rebirth no longer 
need to be resisted or craved, we may want to speak of abiding in what 
the ancient texts call the “unoriginated.” For we transcend the trauma 
of birth, and indeed the trauma of all beginnings, as well as the trauma 
of temporal endings like death. “Eternity” is simply the present of the 
whole of Time (what Tarthang Tullcu calls “Great Time”): a present 
we may ecstatically enjoy to the extent that we are able to give up our refuge
6B Merleau-Ponty, op. cit., p. 423.
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in egological re-presentation and entrust ourselves to the openness of being. 
Existing (ek-sisting) in, and as, such openness is, in its essence, simply 
being fully alive, fully awake: wonderfully receptive and responsive to 
the freshness of the present which Great Time has graciously and gener­
ously granted (sent) us.
If indeed, as Merleau-Ponty says, “the body is essentially an expressive 
space,”6’ i.e., if the human body is really space expressing itself, space 
at its most expressive, how could we experience our space-time field of 
sensuous existence as a clearing that continues to express what is past (for 
example, the presence-with-us of deceased family and friends) ? How 
can we “create a space of expressiveness” so open that even the absent 
may be expressively present? These questions may spur us to ponder 
the satisfactoriness of our everyday life; and they may even suggest 
certain opportunities to expand and realize the intrinsic healthiness of a 
holistic time-space incarnation.
Returning, now, to the aporia with which we opened our discussion of 
the nature and potentialities of temporal experience, I would like to 
propose an interpretation of Suzuki’s beautiful observation. Although 
initially it seems obscure, it turns out, in fact, to be a very simple and 
accurate phenomenological statement, whose poetic quality surely 
conveys its unfathomable clarity. Insofar as we are experientially very 
open, we may indeed, as he says, hear the bell “before” it rings and 
see the bird’s flight “before” it moves into the focal field of our vision. 
For, to begin with, such openness implies that, although we may be 
filled with wonder, we will not be startled by an “unexpected” sound or 
sight. We are always, in openness, prepared for the unexpected. In a 
sense, since we are not caught up in our representations, everything is 
unexpected; but we also could say, with equal truth, that everything 
that takes place—everything that timing grants—is already fully expected. 
Such is the radical nature of non-attachment with regard to the future. 
However, this attitude in no way involves a loss of our sense of wonder. 
Quite the contrary, in fact. For our concentration, our mindfulness, 
enables us to experience the sounding of the bell and the flight of the bird 
as events of being (Heidegger’s word is Ereignis): there is (es gibt) a presenc- 
ing of being, a “sending” and “coming forth” into the wonderful light 
of unconcealment. Furthermore, insofar as this present is the present 
•9 Merleau-Ponty, op. tit., p. 146.
106
PAINFUL TIME, ECSTATIC TIME
of such an Ereignisi it is also the openness of our access to the past. Hearing 
the bell before it rings and seeing the bird before it takes to the air is a 
hearing and a seeing in, and of, the present which does not miss (crave) 
the past of the bell now heard and the bird now seen. Phenomenologically 
speaking, the past is still present in the sounding of the bell: it resounds in 
its ringing as the silence from where the ringing was granted. Likewise, 
the past is still present in the visible flight of the bird, for it manifests, like 
a shadow (which is something and yet also nothing), as the gracious way 
in which the reserve of the invisible presences. Non-attachment with 
regard to the past, our freedom from the compulsive need to remember, 
our freedom to forget, enables us to enjoy the present as the present of 
the past. Thus, when we freely listen, we may indeed hear the bell (as 
it was) before it (now) rings. Similarly, when we free our gaze and 
let it wander and dream in the openness of space, we may be granted the 
joy of seeing the bird (as it was) before it (presently) flies. This is the 
mcaningfulness and satisfaction in “foregoing” the past.
Conclusion
The Greek philosopher Herakleitos of Ephcsos (circa 500 b.c.) is claimed 
to have said: “Time is a child playing draughts; the kingly power is a 
child’s.70 There seems to be, here, an anticipatory sounding of what now 
comes to words in the thinking of Tarthang Tulku, who writes:
70 See John Burnet, Early Greek Thinking (New York: Meridian Books, 1957), p. 139. 
See also Kathleen Freeman’s complete translation of the Fragments in Diels, Ancilla to 
the Pre-Socralic Philosophers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 28.
71 Time, Space, and Knowledge, p. 202.
The unshakable clarity of Great Knowledge comes only after 
we see that the inflexible awareness and claims to reality of 
a particular realm of experience are actually a play of ‘time,’ 
and not an absolute. This requirement and challenging character 
are natural processes which are intrinsic to the structure of the 
path (Time) to Great Knowledge.
It is therefore important, both for accuracy within our 
[customary] realm and also in regard to appreciating the infinity 




But the difficulties involved in the process of experiential growth, and a 
healthy skepticism wc can hardly suppress, need not cause us to despair:
Even if we cannot awaken to this universal synthesis [of Great 
Knowledge] immediately, wc can begin to recognize and live in 
accordance with such an integration on a personal level. This 
expressive play-as-Being is always inspiring because it is an 
infinitely-varied play. Wc cannot stagnate while being appreciative 
of such an unbounded drama. Nor can we continue to preserve 
an achievement-orientation, because we find fulfillment 
in what we arc ourselves, in what is at hand. We are no 
longer ... the embodiment of a lower knowing, but are instead 
the [very] embodiment of Being.... There is a subtle fulfillment 
[which is] ‘present’ and constantly going on.72
” Op. at., p. 305.
” Op. cit., p. 306.
In Suzuki’s experiencing of the timing of what Great Time sends into 
the openness of unconcealment, there is, then, what Rinpoche calls an 
“individual enactment of Being.” In the kenshS experience, there is an 
involuntary (spontaneous) release from our normal temporal patterning. 
And because it is accompanied by such sensory vitality and openness, wc 
actually “contribute to Being itself by intensifying and celebrating its 
primordial value.”73
Celebrating the play of Being, we may find both unsurpassable joy 
and indestructible meaningfulness (vajra) in the very simplest events: 
events of unconccalment, like the ringing of a bell and the flight of a 
bird.... If toward the present wc are open.
APPENDIX
77zz Human Body in Movement
Heidegger’s hermeneutical critique of the history of the human experience 
of motion, which focuses mainly on Aristotle and the Newtonian revolu­
tion, directly bears on our preceding analysis of irreversible linear tem­
porality and the inherent experiential possibility of an alternative way 
of inhabiting of our spatio-temporal world. More specifically, it seems 
to me that Heidegger’s interpretation of how Aristotle’s thinking about 
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motion underwent a fateful “reversal” in Newton sheds a good deal of 
light on Tarthang Tulku’s analysis, in Time, Space and Knowledge, of how 
the progressive loss of pristine cognitiveness (Sanskrit: jOana’, Tibetan: 
ye-shes) results in the fact that we “find ourselves” thrown, or “sent,” 
into an extremely constricting, extremely pressing space-time “tube.” 
Considered in this light, Heidegger’s return to Aristotle’s philosophy of 
nature (which we may presume to reflect the Greek experience of his time) 
somewhat parallels, and therefore may help us to understand, Rinpoche’s 
attempt to penetrate the delusory nature of our samsaric space-time 
projections and open up an alternative modality of experience.
In order, briefly, to show the parallels, I will extract from the 
translated text of Heidegger’s 1935-36 lecture, “Basic Questions of 
Metaphysics” (published in Germany as Die Frage nach dem Ding) certain 
key propositions.74 For the sake of brevity, however, I will refrain from 
making lengthy comments on them here, except to say that Heidegger’s 
discussion assumes decisive relevance only when we construe the motion of 
natural bodies to include the experiential (experienced) human body. (This ex­
tension of the notion of a natural body is actually not so strange in the 
Aristotelian framework, since, for Aristotle, even the motion of what 
we would call “inanimate things,” e.g., stones, is teleological.) I must 
leave it to the reader, though, to ponder how Heidegger’s discussion may 
possibly help us to interpret our experience of time in relation to the 
extremely difficult Buddhist notion of the Trikdya, construed as a notion 
that makes explicit the primordially intrinsic existential norms of human 
embodiment. Could it be said that the TriAafya guides us, on the path 
of self-realization, “away” from spatio-temporal embodiment as a 
merely “earthly body” and “toward” our embodiment as a perfect 
“celestial body”?
74 Martin Heidegger, Du Fragt nach dm Ding (Tubingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 
1962). This text has been translated by W. B. Barton, Jr. and Vera Deutsch and ap­
pears with an analysis by Eugene Gendlin under the title, What is a Thing? (Chicago: 
Henry Regnery Co., 1967). Pages 66-ro8 of this translation have been included in 
David Farrell Kreil’s anthology, Martin Htidtggtr: BaSic^Writings (New York: Harper 
& Row, 1977). Our page citations will be referred, for the sake of convenience, to the 
Kreil anthology.
(1) “The motion of bodies, however, is hath' auta, according to them, 
themselves. That is to say, how a body moves, i.e., how it relates 
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to place and to which place it relates—all this has its basis in the 
body itself. . .. The body moves according to its nature. A moving 
body, which is itself an arche kineseds, is a natural body. The purely 
earthly body moves downward, the purely fiery body—as every 
blazing flame demonstrates—moves upward. Why? Because the 
earthly body has its place below, the fiery, above. Each body has 
its place according to its kind, and it strives toward that place. 
Around the earth is water, around this, the air, and around this, 
fire—the four elements. When a body moves toward its place 
this motion accords with its nature, kata physin. ... All motions 
against nature are biai, violent.” (p. 260).
(2) “Circular motion and motion in a straight line are the simple 
movements, hapltd. Of these two, circular motion is first, i.e., 
is the higher, and thus, of the highest order. ... In circular 
motion, the body has its place in the motion itself; for this reason 
such motion is perpetual and truly in being. In rectilinear motion the 
place lies only in one direction, away from another place, so that 
motion [e.g., experienced life] comes to an end [i.e., dies] over there.... 
The purest motion, in the sense of change of place, is circular 
motion; it contains, as it were, its place in itself. A body that so 
moves itself, moves itself completely. This is true of all celestial 
bodies. Compared to this, earthly motion is always in a straight line, or 
mixed, or violent, but always incomplete.” (Sec p. 261. Italics and 
bracketed interpolations are my own.)
(3) “There is an essential difference between the motion of celestial 
bodies and earthly bodies. The domains [i.e., dhdtus] of these 
motions are different. How a body moves depends upon its species 
and the place to which it belongs. The where determines the how 
of its Being, for Being means presence [-dnwwenAri/].” (p. 261).
(4) “... in modern thought, circular motion is understood only in 
such a way that a perpetual attracting force from the center is 
necessary for its formation and preservation. With Aristotle, 
however, this ‘force,’ Jynumw, the capacity for its motion, lies in 
the nature of the body itself. The kind of motion of the body and 
its relation to its place depend upon the nature of the body. The 
velocity of natural motion increases the nearer the body comes to its [in­
trinsically appropriate] place’, that is, increase and decrease of velocity 
and cessation of motion depend upon the nature of the body. A motion
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contrary to nature, i.e.t violent motion, has its cause in the force that 
affects it. However, according to its motion, the body, [experienced 
as] driven forcibly, must withdraw from this power, and since 
the body itself does not bring with it any basis for this violent 
motion, its motion must necessarily become slower and finally stop [as 
in our inevitable death, for example].” (p. 261-262. My italics and 
interpolations.)
(5) Departing from the Aristotelian understanding of natural bodies, 
Newton assumes, as an axiom, the proposition: “Every body left 
to itself moves uniformly in a straight line.” Heidegger then 
argues: “That means that the distinction between earthly and 
celestial bodies has become obsolete.” (p. 262). In other words, 
in our samsaric condition of avidyd, we no longer realize any experiential 
differences among modes of embodiment.
(6) “Accordingly, the distinguishing of certain places also disappears. 
Each body itself is changed: place no longer is where the body 
belongs according to its inner nature, but is only a position in 
relation to other positions.” (p. 263). Thus, we lose our Befindlichkeit 
as bodily beings who arc rooted in the timeless traditions of land 
and homeland.
(7) “Therefore the concept of nature changes. Nature is no longer 
the inner principle out of which the motion of the body follows; 
rather, nature is the mode of the variety of the changing relative 
positions of bodies, the manner in which they arc present in 
space and time.” (p. 264).
(8) Galileo, arguing against Aristotle’s sense that different bodies 
move (c.g., upward and downward) at different velocities in 
accordance with their specific nature, repressed his lived experience 
of such differences. In his experiements, the “bodies of different 
weights did not [in fact] arrive at precisely the same time after 
having fallen from the tower, but the difference in time was 
slight.” (p. 266). Thus, against the evidence of his own personal experi­
ence, which his attachment to the goals of an “objective science” 
concealed from him, Galileo argued that “the motion of every 
body is uniform and rectilinear.” (p. 266). But Galileo’s under­
standing merely refects our “normal” experience, to the degree that 
our understanding is really unknowingness (avidya; ma-rig-pa}.
(9) Thus Galileo prepares for Newton’s conceptualization of “what
hi
DAVID MICHAEL LEVIN
should be uniformly determinative of each body as such, i.e., 
for being bodily. All bodies are alike. No motion is special. Every 
place [loka and dhdtu] is like every other, each moment is like 
any other. ... All determinations of bodies have one basic 
blueprint, according to which the natural process is nothing but 
the space-time determination of the motion of points of mass. This funda­
mental design of nature at the same time circumscribes its realm as 
everywhere uniform.” (p. 267). What Heidegger here discerns is the 
very romr process of experiential “straying” {ma-rig-pa} which 
Tarthang Tulku describes. Amazingly, they both bring to light 
the same diagnostic understanding of the process whereby our 
spatio-temporal existence (human embodiment) is experienced 
as becoming progressively restricted and oppressive, and determined 
by the finality and the terror of “untimely” death.
112
